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and speaking through Justice CLIFFORD, said: "Admiralty juris
diction was conferred upon the Government of the United States
by the constitution, and in cases of tort is wholly unaffected by
the considerations suggested in the proposition."
This is the latest judgment of the Supreme Court, and unless it
can be shown that jurisdiction in matters of contract is not as
"wholly unaffected by the considerations" referred to, as juris-
diction in matters of tort, it seems to be my duty, being fully
satisfied that this court has jurisdiction under the constitution
and the law over the contract of the respondents, to award to the
libellants that justice to which the proofs clearly entitle them,
without turning them out of this and requiring them to resort to
another court. I do not think this can be shown, and therefore
Affirm the decree of the District Court.
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SUPREME COURT OF NEW HA31PSHIRE.
i
ADMINISTRATOR.
Right to Administration.-Where two persons are of the same rela-
tionship to the deceased, and one resides in this state and the other
does not, ordinarily the one resident here is entitled to administration,
as of right; but if he makes a claim against the estate which is con-
tested by the heirs, it is proper, within the discretion of the court, to
appoint the one residing out of the state: Pickering v. .Pendexter, Sup.
Court N. H.
AsSUMPSIT.
Assignment of Claim for Services.-Where A. had hired his son to
B. for a given time and at a fixed price, and before the time had ex-
pired he gave an order on B. to pay to 0. the amount then due or which
might become due thereafter for his son's wages, which order was ac-
cepted by B., teld, that after said term of service had expired and
the contract had been fully performed by A., C. might maintain an
action for money had and received, against B., for the amount agreed
to be paid for such labor: Kent v. Watson, Sup. Court N. H.
And if C. should sell this order to a third person, before or after
suit brought upon it, the action might still be maintained in the name
of C., by his consent, for the benefit of the real owner: Id.
IWe are indebted for these notes to the courtesy of the judges. The volume of
reports in which the cases will appear cannot yet be indicated.
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Damages.for Con version of Gold Coin.-Where gold coin was pledged
as security for becoming bail, and it afterwards rose in value much above
par, it was held, that, in an action for money had and received, the
damages must be limited to the amount of money received, with interest,
and could not be enhanced by an increase of its value as merchandise;
and held, also, that, in trover, the measure of damages would be the
value of the coin at the time it was converted, and not when the verdict
was rendered: Frothingham et al. v. .Morse, Sup. Court N. H.
Agreement to exchange Lands--Performance by one Party and Re-
fusal by Other-Action for Value of Land conveyed.-Plaintiff and
defendant had made a parol agreement by which plaintiff was to convey
to defendant a tract of wild land in part payment for a farm which
defendant was to convey to plaintiff. Plaintiff had conveyed the wild
land to defendant, but defendant refused to convey the farm to plaintiff.
Held, that plaintiff might rescind the contract and recover the value
of the wild land in an action of indebitatus assumysit for lend sold:
Smith v. Hlatch, Sup. Court N. H.
Alsb held, that where the defendant had sold the wild land for cash,
the plaintiff might rescind the original contract, adopt the defendant's
act of selling, and ratify the sale, and recover of defendant the price he
received for the land in an action for money had and received: Id.
Variance.-In assumpsit on account annexed, the plaintiff cannot go
outside of his specification, either in respect to debt or credit, without
an amendment; and, therefore, proof that an item of credit was entered
by mistake, is incompetent: Saunders v. Osgood, Sup. Court N. H.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Illegal Consideration -The payee of a note, part of the consideration
of which was the sale of intoxicating liquor in violation of the law of the
state, having accepted the note with notice, cannot recover upon it
against the maker: Kidder et al. v. Blake et al., Sup. Court N. H.
Where A., the payee of a note void between himself and B. and C.,
the makers, for illegality of consideration, surrendered it to B. and D.,
in whose hands it was equally invalid: Held, that this was not a suffi-
cient consideration for a note from B. and D. to A.: Id.
The release by A. of an attachment in a suit brought by him against B.
and D. upon their note so given to him, is no sufficient consideration for
a promise by D. to A. that ," the note should Ire paid ;" and such a
promise upon condition that the attachment should be released, and the
consequent release of the attachment will not, in a subsequent suit by
A., against B. and D. upon the note, estop D. to deny its validity: Id.
COMMON CARRIER.
Right of Consignee to examine Goods before Acceptance.-Where a
package of goods is forwarded by a carrier, to be paid for on delivery,
the consignee is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to inspect them
before he accepts them; and the carrier may afford him reasonable
facilities for doing so, without making himself chargeable for the price,
even if he put them into the hands of the consignee for that purpose,
and receive from him the price as personal security to the carrier that
the goods shall be returned if not accepted, after a reasonable oppor
tunity to examine them: Lyons & Co. v. Hill & Co., Sup. Court N. H.
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CONTRACT.
Money paid with Knowledge of Failure of Consideration cannot be
recovered back.-An action for money had and received will not lie to
recover back money paid upon a promissory note, upon the ground that
the consideration had partially failed, where the plaintiff, when he paid
the note, was fully aware of the facts upon which such claim of failure
was founded, but the payment must be regarded as voluntary: Sessions
v. Jleserve, Sup. Court N. H.
It would be the same where it was agreed, when the note was given,
that a deduction should be made to conform to the appraisal of a third
person of some grain for which the note was given, and, on making
such appraisal, the plaintiff claimed the deduction, which the defendant
refused, and thereupon the plaintiff paid the whole: Id
Statute of Frauds.-A contract to work for another two years, for
one hundred dollars for the first year, and two hundred dollars for the
second, is within the Statute of Frauds as a contract nit to be performed
within a year, and a memorandum in writing is necessary: Emery v.
Smith, Sup. Court N. H.
Such a contract is not taken out of the statute by its performance on
one side; but the party doing the work must resort to a quantiim meruit,
even if there has been part performance on the other side: Id.
In a quantum meruit for such services, where the defendant insists
upon the statute, the plaintiff may recover the value of those services,
but the agreement is not admissible to affect the amount of damages: .d.
COSTS.
.lroney paid for Copies of Deeds used as Evidence at Trial.-Ioney
paid for copies of deeds which are necessary to be used in evidence, in
proving title to the premises in question, may be properly charged in
bills of costs: Ela v. Knox, Sup. Court N. H.
But copies of deeds procured for the purpose of preparing the case
for trial on either side but which are not to be used in evidence in
proving title, or some other competent fact, will not be allowed : Id.
In cases where surveys and plans are needed in preparing the case for
trial, and where the plans are used on trial, the expenses of the survey
and making the plans are not to be allowed in the bill of costs: Id.
Taxation of, by1 Commiss;oner.-The report of a commissioner,
appointed by the court to tax the costs in an action at law, should show
what items of costs are allowed by him: Morse v. Allen, Sup. Court N.H.
DEED.
Delivery-Presumption, of Grantee's Assent.-To constitute a valid
delivery of a deed, it must pass into the hands of the grantee, or some
one for him, in such way as to be beyond the legal control of the grantor,
and therefore, if placed in the hands of a third person to -be by him
delivered to the grantee, it will not be good against an intervening
attachment of the land: Johnson v. Farlely, Sup. Court N. H.
Where a deed of land is delivered to a third person for the use o± the
grantee, his assent will not be presumed unless it be clearly beneficial
to him; and therefore, if the deed conveys all of a debtor's real estate
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as security for the debts of forty different persons, and at the same time
all the rest of the debtor's property is conveyed as security for other
creditors, but not in the manner prescribed by the laws regulating
assignments, the assent of the grantees in such deed will not be pre-
sumed : Id.
EXECUTION.
Evidence of Partnership Debt.-Where the priority of different
creditors attaching the property of a firm is to be determined by the
individual or partnership character of their respective claims, the mere
fact that a promissory note is signed by the individuals who compose
the firm, is insufficient to show that it is a partnership debt: Gay &
Co. v. Johnson, Sup. Court N. H.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Purchase by Wife of Promissory Note signed by Husband.-A nego-
tiable note given tV a third party by a husband before his marriage, is
not extinguished by the mere fact of its purchase from such third party
by the wife, after marriage, with money belonging to her before mar-
riage, not reduced to possession by the husband: Russ v. George, Sup.
Court N. H.
One to whom the wife has subsequently to her purchase of the note
transferred it with her husband's assent, may maintain an action upon
it against the husband: Id.
The mere facts that the money with which the note was purchased
by the wife was "1 the proceeds of the wife's real estate" sold after
marriage, and was "kept in her control and not converted by her hus-
band," and that the "note was never by the husband reduced to pos-
session or in any way converted, but was held by the wife till its transfer,"
do not, as matter of law, amount to an -assent by him to her disposing
of it : Id.
Such an assenft may be inferred from circumstances; but whether
such an inference is to be made is ordinarily a question of fact for the
jury: Id.
Earnings of Wife belong to Husband, but not attachable by Creditors.
-The personal services and earnings of the wife, and the profits and
income of any business in which she may engage, at common law and
under our statutes of 1846 and 1860, relating to the rights of married
women, belong to the husband absolutely, and cannot be held by the
wife to her sole and separate use: Hoyt v. White, Sup. Court N. H.
But while the husband may thus enjoy and appropriate the earnings
of his wife and the profits of her services, still, under our law regulat-
ing the trustee process, the husband's creditors cannot, on that process,
hold any of the avails of the wife's personal services or earnings: .d.
Rights of Widow as to Dower and Homestead in an Equitj of Re-
demption.-A widow is entitled to dower and homestead in an equity
of redemption in real estate of her late husband against all persons,
except the mortgagee or those claiming under him: Norris v. Miforrison,
Sup. Court N. H.
But she cannot have dower or homestead as against the mortgagee,
except by payment of the whole mortgage-debt: Id.
Against any and every one having.an interest in the redemption and
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who has actually redeemed the mortgage, she can hold her dower and
homestead upon payment of contribution: Id.
If the administrator redeems the mortgage from assets of the estate,
then the widow takes dower and homestead without contribution: Id.
After the decease of the mortgagee, if the equity of redemption is
purchased by the mortgagor, the two estates, that under the mbrtgage
and the equity of redemption, become merged, as though some third
person had purchased the equity and then redeemed the mortgage; and
in such case the widow may hold her dower and homestead discharged
from the mortgage by paying contribution only: Id.
In such case, it is immaterial whether the dower and homestead or
either of them be first assigned or the equity be first sold, since the
owners of these interests, in either case, stand on the same ground in
equity, their separate estates commencing, not from the time of the
assignment or sale, but from the death of the intestate : Id.
Hence the mortgage-debt is to be shared between the owner of the
equity of redemption and the widow having dower and homestead,
according to the relative value of the proportion of mortgaged property
held by each: d.
LJIMITATIONS.
ANote Secured by -Mortgage.-Under our Statute of Limitations, when
a note has been secured by any mortgage under seal, whether of real
or personal estate, if such note has not been paid or the mortgage
given to secure it discharged, an action upon the note will not be barred
by the statute until such statute would operate as a bar to a suit upon
such mortgage: Alexander v. Whipple, Sup. Court N. H.
And it makes no difference in that respect whether or not the pro-
perty mortgaged is still available for the payment of the mortgage-
debt: id.
PLEADING.
Waiver of Objection to Time of Pleading a new Plea.-Where the
plaintiff, during the pendency of his action, had recovered a judgment
against the defendants in another state for the same cause of action, an
agreement in due form between the parties, made several terms after
the recovery of that judgment and after the general issue had been
pleaded, that the defendants may file a plea setting forth the judgment
recovered "without prejudice to the legal rights of the parties," in bar
of the further maintenance of the action, without costs, setting forth the
plaintiff's objection to "the reception of this plea from the defendants,"
and stating that the counsel for the defendants appear for subsequent
attaching creditors and the assignee of the defendant corporation, and
agreeing that the question whether this judgment so recovered can
avail the defendants, be reserved for decision, is a waiver of any objec-
tion on account of the time when the plea is offered, if it is duly filed
according to the agreement: Child v. The Eureka Powder Works, Sup.
Court N. H.
Subsequent attaching creditors and the assignee of the defendant
upon the record, having been admitted to defend in his name, may plead
a former recovery by the plaintiff, where the defendant could have
pleaded such a recovery as a defence: Id.
In assumpsit, a judgment for the same cause of action rendered in
the Supreme Court of New York during the pendency of the plaintiff's
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action here, may be pleaded in bar of the further maintenance of the
action; and it is not a sufficient replication to such a plea that the
plaintiff in his action here had caused the defendants' property to be
attached, and that the defendants' property in either state alone was
insufficient to satisfy the amount due the plaintiff upon the cause of
action set forth in his declaration : Id.
PRACTICE.
Appeal from Decree of Probate Judge- What .Natters tre open. to
Review.-Upon an appeal from a decree of the judge of probate allow-
ing a guardian's account, the only matters open to inquiry by the appel-
lant are those specified in his reasons for appeal; but the appellee is
not thus confined, but may, on such appeal, show error in any part of
the decree and have it corrected: Patrick v. Cowles, Sup. Court N. H.
In such case the original reasons for appeal may be amended in any
way that does not change the nature of the claim; the manner of stat-
ing the claim may be changed, and the grounds on which it is sought
to be recovered, provided the court can see that the same thing is
sought to be recovered or accomplished under the amendment as under
the original reasons for appeal: Id.
New and independent reasons for appeal cannot be assigned by way
of amendment: .d.
In such cases of appeal, neither party can claim, as a matter of right,
that any question of fact that may arise shall be submitted to a jury;
but the court may, in its discretion, submit any such fact to a jury
when deemed proper: Id.
Where an auditor is appointed by this court, in a case like this, to
hear the evidence and report the facts, he does not derive his powers
from the statute providing for the appointment of auditors to state
accounts between parties, nor have the parties in such case any right to
try by a jury any facts thus found by the auditor: .1d.
If either party desires a jury trial, the motion for issues should be
made before the appointment of an auditor: Id.
SET-OFF.
Note or Judgment against Principal and Surety may be set off against
Claim by Surety alozze.-A note signed by a principal and surety may
be set-off against a note due to such principal alone. So a judgment
against two, where it is admitted or proved that one is principal and the
other surety, would stand on the same ground as an offset as a note
aga'nst the same persons in the same capacity: Andrews v. Varrell, Sup.
C- urt N. H.
Where the plaintiff's claim is sued in the name of some nominal
party, or where the defendant's claim against the plaintiff is a judg-
ment- in the name of some nominal party, but belongs to the defendant
and did so at the time of suit brought, the offset may be made, as the
demands will be regarded as mutual if between the same parties in
interest, without regard to parties merely nominal: .d.
Where defendant held a note against the plaintiff at date of plaintiff's
writ, which afterwards, and during the pendency of plaintiff's suit,
passes into judgment, he cannot file either the note or the judgment in
offset to plaintiff's claim: Id
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SHERIFF.
Suit for Default of Deputgy-Deputy being released, is competent Wit-
ness-Return made bly order of a Party.-In a suit by an administra.
trix against a sheriff for the default of his deputy, the latter, not having
taken upon him the defence of the suit, and having been released by
the sheriff, is a competent witness, although the plaintiff did not elect
to testify: Stevens, Administratrix, v. Colbyl, Sup. Court N. H.
If an attorney of a creditor, acting under authority, delivers an
execution to a deputy sheriff, and assumes to give special directions as
to the mode and manner of executing the process, and makes a return
upon it which he directs him to sign, and the officer obeys those direc-
tions, he is to be regarded as the agent of such creditor, and the
sheriff will not be liable for a defect in such return: Id.
TROVER.
Poerty not wi the Plaintffs.-A melodeon was sold to one Ripley,
for the price of which he gave his promissory note, but the property
was not to vest until his note was paid. Afterwards Ripley sold the
instrument to the defendant, and Ripley's note was transferred by the
vendors to a third person. field, that the interest of the vendors in
the melodeon was incident to the note, as in the case of a mortgage or
pledge, and that upon the transfer of the note the interest of the payees
in the melodeon passed to the indorsee, and that consequently the vend-
ors, these plaintiffs, could not maintain trover for it: Esty & Green v.
Graham, Sup. Court N. H.
Sufficiency of Descrition-Banc Bills.-In trover for bank bills, a
description of them as "certain current bank bills, representing in all
one hundred and fifty dollars in money, and of the value of one hun-
dred and fifty dollars," is good after verdict: Town of Colebrook v.
.Merrill, Sup. Court N. H.
WILLs.
Rule against Perpetuities-Mortgage by Tenant in Common-Estop-
yel of Co-tenants-Liability of Tenants in Common for Life to Re-
mainder-man.-Where there was a devise to J. W. and wife for their
lives, and after their death to the children of J. W. for their lives, and
the lives of the survivors of them, and then to the grand children of J.
W. in fee, it was held, that the limitation over to the grandchildren was
void for remoteness, inasmuch as it might not take effect during the life
or lives of persons in being at the death of the testator, and twenty-one
years after. field, also, that the children of J. W. took only a life
estate, and that it was not enlarged to a fee by the fact that the limita-
tion over was void: Wood et al. v. Griffin, Sup. Court N. H.
Where one of the children of J. W. mortgaged all his. interest in the
estate, the others saying at the time to the mortgagee that they would
make no trouble about his cutting the timber on the mortgagor's share,
it was held, that the other children, after the death of the mortgagors,
were not estopped by such declarations, the mortgagee being fully aware
of the true state of the title: Id.
Where such mortgagee enters upon the share so mortgaged, claiming
the entire title, it is in law an ouster of the other tenants in common,
and they may maintain trespass therefor: Id.
Where such action is commenced by a husband and wife in her Tight,
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and she afterwards dies, the action may still be prosecuted by the
husband: Id.
Tenants in common for life are liable to the remainder-man or rever.
sioner for an injury to the inheritance, by a stranger, or by part of the
tenants in common; and, having made satisfaction for the injury to such
remainder-man or reversioner, they may recover over against the wrong-
doer the amount they have been compelled to pay; but, until they have
made such satisfaction, they can recover only for the injury to their
possession : Id.
Bequest of Personal Property for Life with Remain der.-Where a
remainder in personal property was given by will to a married woman
in 1825, and at the death of the tenant for life it came into the posses-
sion of a third person, held, that the next of kin of such married woman
on her death can maintain no suit for it, either at law or equity, against
such third person, without taking out administration: and held, also,
that the surviving husband of such married woman was, at common law,
entitled to the beneficial use of such property, even although he had not
taken administration : Weeks v. Jewett and Wife et al., Sup. Court N. H.
Where an executor had delivered over to the tenant for life the per-
sonal property given by the will, and such tenant had received and
retained it until her death, it was held, that the executor could not, as
such, maintain a suit against a third person to recover it, as his duty
must, in the absence of any provisions in the will to the contrary, be
regarded as discharged by the delivery to the legatee: Id..
WITNIESS.
Opinions not of Eaperts.-Opinions or conclusions of witnesses nor
experts, from facts and appearances observed by them, are sometimes
admissible from necessity and to prevent the failure of justice, as in
question of identity of person, handwriting, sounds, size, distance, and
the like: Whittiqr y. Town of Franklin, Sup. Court N. H.
But when the facts or appearances on which these conclusions rest
can be described so as to be understood by others, they should be, and
the jury left to form their own opinion: Id.
Where the question was whether a horse went over a bank by a high-
way in the defendant town, by reason of fright or otherwise, a witness
was allowed to state in substance that the horse did not appear to be
frightened but sulky; and it was held to be admissible, as coming within
the exception arising from necessity: Id.
To prove the bad habits of the horse at the time of the accident,
evidence of particular instances of vicious conduct is admissible: Id.
Witness to a Will must be competent at time of Attestation- Witness
to a Deed need only be competent at'time of Proving- Construction of
Statutes.-The "credible witnesses" which the statute requires in the
ease of wills, must -be witnesses who are at the time of the attestation
competent to testify and prove its execution: Frink v. Pond, Sup.
Court N. H.
But in case of a deed of real estate, the "4 two or more witnesses" by
whom the statute requires it shall be attested, need not be competent at
the time of attesting the deed; but if either be competent at the time
the attestation is to be proved, that is sufficient: 1d.
Where the legislature adopt or re-enact a statute, the previous con-
struetion of the statute, as settled by the courts of law, is also adopted: Id.
